A typical setting in GHM's work starts with a competitive tender, transformed into bilateral monopoly between a buyer and seller once the contract is awarded. There is often relationship specific investment where one or more of the following elements of the transaction are considered unforeseeable ex-ante and unverifiable ex-post: nature of good, amount of effort and investment -with implications for the price and quantity of output and hence for the division of surplus between contractual parties. Because the specification of every possible future contingency or their verification is costly most long-term contracts are considered to be incomplete. In the presence of non-contractible investments (e.g. effort to innovate and cut costs) the ex-post efficient outcome cannot be achieved after uncertainty is resolved -unlike in the Coasian (1960) world with renegotiation and side payments. Under the incomplete contracts framework, renegotiation may mean that the investor will have to share the benefits of his/her efforts with the other party. Anticipating this possibility, one of the parties under-invests or shades his/her services. This is the source of inefficiency or underoptimality in the TIC. Integration of economic activities subject to the contract and allocation of property rights to one party can solve the problem , Hart and Moore 1988 .
While the essential elements of the TIC have been maintained, criticism of the approach has brought about the revision of certain aspects of the framework. For example, Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Tirole (1999) raised three issues with respect to the internal consistency of the theory.
First, the reconciliation of unforeseen contingencies in long-term contractual relations is seen difficult when individuals are assumed to be rational and uncertainty is ruled out. Contingencies can at worst be ex ante indescribable in which case the payoff structure for every possible state of the world could be estimated using dynamic programming or ex-post renegotiation given symmetric information.
Second, the dependence of the TIC on non-contractible investments is viewed to be inconsistent with the assumption of symmetric information. Third, the assertion that [some] information is unverifiable is problematic. Parties may not agree on what transpired ex-post but this is only possible i) if there are information asymmetries which are assumed away by GHM or ii) they interpret facts in different ways which implies bounded rationality, also assumed away by GHM. contracts with uncertainty and bounded rationality, their later work (2007, 2008) aimed to deal with some of the criticisms directed at their work. In particular, they introduced a degree of uncertainty, dropped the assumption of non-contractible investments in transactions and eliminated the reliance of their conclusion regarding shading or ex post inefficiency on those assumptions. Instead, they asserted that the tendency of 'shading' in long-term contracts was linked to the parties' 'feelings of entitlements', which they form with reference to contracts, instead of non-contractible investments.
Distinguishing between perfunctory and consummate service provision it is argued that when the outcomes of trade and the sense of entitlements of the parties are not aligned, the aggrieved party will provide perfunctory service which complies with her contractual obligations but is not the best service feasible under the same cost structure. After the uncertainty about values and costs is resolved, ex-post inefficiency may not be eliminated by renegotiation when value from the service is greater than its cost because the buyer will feel entitled to a price close to cost while the seller will want a price close to the value of the service. Hence, one of the parties is expected to shade following renegotiation.
The theory of incomplete contracts has been used to explain various economic phenomena such as intra-firm trade and predominance of debt finance (Aghion and Holden 2011) . In contribution to the property rights theory, the TIC scholars have also argued that the choice between public and private ownership could be made with reference to the cost and benefits of outsourcing with incomplete contracts versus provision under uniform ownership. This is because contractual incompleteness bestows residual control rights to asset owners for circumstances that are unspecified in contracts and distorts the incentives to invest. The allocation and use of these residual rights influences the This prediction is based on the view that any undertaking by a public employee for better performance is subject to approval and even if approved, the rewards do not fully accrue to the public manager as all or part of the benefits are expropriated by the principal. This is dubbed as the 'hold-up problem' in the public sector. The private contractor is assumed to be less subject to approval and hold-up. This leads the proponents of the TIC to reach the general conclusion that the incentives for efficiency improving efforts are greater under private ownership unless the social gains from cost reduction is small and they are offset by the negative impact of cost cutting efforts on quality (quality shading).
The scholars of TIC distinguish themselves from agency theorists -who focus on information asymmetries and are said to assume complete contracts (Hart 2003) . In reality, the inefficiencies associated with contractual incompleteness are recognised by different schools of economic thought, including transaction cost economists (e.g. Williamson as cited above) and agency/ incentive theorists such as Laffont (1987 , 1992 . Nevertheless, they have not considered privatisation as a unique solution to contractual incompleteness.
3. An application: the management contract in the Ghanaian water sector
Background and overall performance results
Ghana gained its independence in 1957 but remained as a low income country with economic progress in some years and setbacks in others. Like many other developing countries it went into a prolonged recession and austerity phase in the 1970s and 1980s. Various reform programmes since then have adopted an increasingly neo-liberal orientation under the influence and direction of the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   7 The endeavours to introduce private sector participation (PSP) into water sector have been part of the wider liberalisation trends in Ghana. The sector was restructured through redundancies and separation of urban water from unprofitable elements of the services (i.e. sanitation and rural supply), which were retained within the public sector in order to attract private investors to the more commercially viable urban water element. The initial attempts for a 20-year lease contract was abandoned in favour of a five-year management contract (MC) show that improvements were already underway in the pre-contractual period due to restructuring.
The company failed to achieve the contractual target of five percent reduction in non-revenue water (NRW). There were notable improvements in revenue generation, billing and collection in the post contract period largely because of a cumulative tariff rise of 105% after the introduction of the management contract. However, the unit costs as well as the chemical consumption both in terms of cost and quantity increased. Contractual requirements for water quality have been breached by the private contractor with extensive noncompliance in terms of the bacteriological and chemical content of the water produced and the number sample analyses carried out. The performance of the AVRL for reducing water consumption of public sector organisations and improving customer response could not be assessed because of lack of metering and absence of established reporting systems on customer complaints, respectively (Fichtner 2010) .
In terms of access to safe water, a conspicuous progress has been made over the last several decades in Ghana but not much is owed to the privatisation process. were available, debt and workforce restructuring -as an important cost cutting exercise-had taken place and the number of water systems had been reduced.
As a consequence, when the AVRL's contract reached the expiry date, the operational management of the urban water sector reverted back to the public sector despite the management contract had explicitly envisaged a lease contract in the aftermath. The important question at this point is then why GWCL or other public agencies could not reinforce the realisation of targets earlier through their supervisory and monitoring role or hold the private operator accountable for its failure to comply with the contractual requirements. In the next section, we attempt to answer this question by discussing contractual basis of the poor performance by the private operator.
The post mortem: the nature of 'incompleteness' of the management contract
The contractual problems in the Ghanian urban water sector had a number of elements. The first crucial flaw in the contract was that it left the baseline data for many operational indicators, against which the performance of the operator could be assessed, to be established and agreed typically within three, six or twelve months from the commencement of the private operator (GWCL 2005) . This was accounted for by sub-standard metering, both in terms of coverage and reliability (Fichtner 2007) . For example, the contract required NRW to be reduced by, at least, five per cent per annum but did not state the level from which it was to be lowered. In the absence of appropriate baseline, the operator pleaded for exoneration on various grounds, in particular, absence of full and effective metering. 4 With the operator dragging its feet on NRW, agreements on the finer details of implementation of the NRW targets were still pending as of 2010. Indeed, as exemplified in Column 4 of Table 2, the tale was similar in all other aspects of performance monitoring. As late as 2010, one year before the expiry of the contract, the agreements between the grantor and the operator were still pending on the details of indicators, baselines, penalties and incentives.
Secondly, the contract contained many vague terms that led to differences in interpretation and created difficulties in contractual implementation. For example, the operator was required to take certain decisions 'in consultation with' the GWCL. This created complications for final decisions when consultation did not result in agreement for action. Other problematic terms, that generated disputes between the grantor and the operator, included 'prudent spending' and 'reasonable and necessary costs', 'key operator staff', 'priority customers', 'suggested capital investment reports'.
The contract also defined the relationship between the parties in an ambiguous way. In section 12.4, it had described the status of the operator as 'an independent contractor' not an agent or partner of the grantor. This proved to be thorny, not least because the GWCL had been assigned a 'supervisory role' in section 4.5 of the contract but also the two bodies had to operate interdependently in a wide range of areas such as technical and financial reporting (since GWCL's reporting to other public institutions depended on the AVRL's reporting), management of human resources (since GWCL was still the employer of the staff seconded to the AVRL) and investment planning.
[ Table 2 A snapshot of issues in the implementation of the management contract] Thirdly, the contract included some financial penalties and incentives, beyond the management fee, for the private operator to achieve the intended improvements. Non-compliance with contractual requirements with respect to the treatment plant, water quality, NRW, receivable accounts and customer response were subject to penalty reduction from the Operator's Base Fee. Nevertheless, the penalty reduction was never applied during private management in spite of widespread contractual non-compliance. Several factors accounted for this. Foremost in this respect was the fact that, the verification of non-compliance depended on reporting data for identified indicators but the contract had specified no penalty for non-reporting. For example, the MC had imposed penalty if water quality standards were breached for two consecutive days and average response to customer inquiries exceeded 48 hours. Despite the fact that the operator breached the standards, the penalties could not be applied because it did not provide data with sufficient detail to establish if the contractual limits had been surpassed (Fichtner 2010) . Moreover, the contract, peculiarly, required the operator to propose the extent and nature of penalties in some cases. For example, the penalty for non-compliance with the NRW reduction target was left to the operator to propose. Predictably, no agreement was reached between the parties in this respect until the expiry of the MC. In addition, the absence of, and Furthermore, the Clause 5. 1.3 (vi) in the contract relinquished any penalty for the Operator if failure to meet service standards is caused by 'the existence of a Snag Item which cannot be reasonably cured by minor works that can be financed by the RRR Fund' (GWCL 2005: 13) .
However, the MC left the identification of 'snag items' to the operator in its Initial Review Report, subject to confirmation by the technical operator. This presented the operator with potential for opportunism as acknowledged by the Technical Auditor, and hence undermined the intended outcomes of the MC.
"...it is clear that snag items are a tool of the operator to avoid penalties imposed in the contract. In order to achieve good performance within the execution of the management contract, the snag items should be defined in a reasonable way so that they will not form insurmountable obstacles which cannot be handled by both parties." (Fichtner 2007: 4-1) Indeed, the AVRL, in its Initial Review Report (AVRL 2006) presented 'everything as 'snag' as if it had taken over a dead body', in the words of senior GWCL managers. The technical auditor also complained about the long list of snag items and lack of sufficient detail about them in the review document, which delayed the approval.
Fourthly, the contract assigned the full control of cash accounts (namely, Revenue Collection Account or the RCA, as well as the RRR Fund, financed by the donor grants) to the operator following the advice of the World Bank for minimising the interventions of the grantor and 'the smooth operations of the private company' (World Bank 2004). However, GWCL's lack of control over the RCA coupled with fuzzy terms in the contractual spending hierarchy (such as 'reasonable and prudent maintenance costs') meant that the operator had very little incentive for surplus accumulation and transfer to the grantor. Lack of revenue transfer became a major source of grievance for the GWCL as it was under pressure to fund 65 to 75 percent of the required investment of around 100 million USD per annum.
5 Problematic disbursement of funding and associated transfer of revenue from operator to grantor is validated by press reports. 'If any such profit would be declared, the certification should have been done. This is why we have not made any public comments on that statement." (GhanaWeb,
May 2009)
Finally, another critical drawback in the design of the contract was related to human resources.
The section 12.6 indicated that the MC superseded all prior documents, including minutes of negotiations, bidding documents, schedules which contained required or proposed staffing levels and qualifications of the operator's managerial staff. Because of this crucial omission it is confirmed by the GWCL as well as the SEC (2011) that the senior management positions were filled in with personnel, lacking adequate experience and appropriate qualifications after the award of the contract.
A critical assessment of the theory of incomplete contracts in the context of water privatisation in Ghana

Are future contingencies the only cause of contractual incompleteness?
Recall that in the TIC incompleteness occurs where rational parties to a contract cannot specify all potential states of the world in the face of future contingencies. This difficulty might be due to uncertainty (not knowing the outcomes) or the high cost of specifying every future eventuality and the related division of surplus. While these factors may be important in general, in the case study under investigation here, neither have been the decisive factors for the incompleteness of the management contract. Not a single item which we discussed in Section 3.2 above pointed to the difficulties associated with future contingencies in the case of private MC in the water sector in Ghana.
The lack of baselines in the contract and the problems associated with them could have been avoided if the public authorities conducted measurements first, following full metering at the points of perhaps an irony in this matter in that a contract that could not define the current circumstances and five-year targets for the private operator, zealously prescribed the future status of the sector.
Validity of the proposition that privatisation could be a remedy for 'the hold-up' problem
As outlined previously, the scholars of the TIC assert that efficiency enhancements under public ownership are difficult because innovative or cost cutting efforts of public managers are subject to approval and hold-up unlike their private counterparts who have better incentives for performance improvement. Hence is the conclusion that 'the case for private arrangements is extremely strong' 6 for services such as prisons, schools, garbage collection and weapons procurement unless the social gains from cost reduction is small and they are offset by the negative impact of cost cutting efforts on quality (Hart et al 1997 (Hart et al : 1156 .
Contrary to the arguments by Hart et al (1997) , in the case of Ghana urban water, it was the private operator, which in fulfilling its contractual obligations held-up the GWCL. As discussed in section 3.2, it did not bring in appropriately qualified and experienced personnel. It deliberately maintained the contractual target for NRW reduction as a disputed terrain, a strategy that was considerably successful in circumventing its responsibility. The unit cost of production increased and water quality deteriorated under private management (Fichtner 2010 , SEC 2011 . No significant innovation has been noted outside those related to the availability of funding. The private operator Several methodological issues inherent to the TIC account for the divergence of practical outcomes from the theory. Firstly, the factors that may lead one party to hold-up another in a contractual relationship are not fully explored in the theory. The problem is formulated in the TIC as one of incentives and it is assumed that the move from an employment contract between state and public manager to a procurement contract between private corporations and state would activate the mute incentives that are presumed to exist in public sector employment contracts. This view is rather simplistic and problematic. The employment contracts beyond the private participation contracts are disregarded largely because production relations are left out of analysis for simplicity. Incentive issues in owner-manager-employee relations are well established -by the literature on agency and asymmetric information-and not only do they prevail in public but also in private sector organisations (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987) .
Secondly, if contractual incompleteness brings in uncontracted benefits for the private party, incompleteness itself can lead private sector to hold-up the state agency. When this is the case, the hold-up problem between public principal and public manager would be replaced with the hold-up problem between the private operator and its public counterpart after private participation. This issue is side-stepped in TIC through a convenient mix-up of the term 'ownership' with the vaguer concept of 'private arrangements' which in this context could be used to various effects including the following.
i) Full transfer of ownership and control to private sector as in privatisation of competitive industries ii) Regulated private ownership as in water and electricity utilities Of all these cases, only in the first one (i) direct exchange takes place between producers and consumers without state playing an intermediary role in the process. In the second case (ii), the contracts between users and producers are products of incessant regulation where a public agency would determine various aspects of service delivery which may include the rules of conduct, pricing, rate of return, quality and quantity of goods and services. In private participation projects (iii) for public services at least three sets of contracts are maintained: between suppliers and consumers;
between the state and the suppliers; and between the contractual parties of the outsourced services and their employees.
For most public services, including prison services, garbage and waste collection, health, education and water and sanitation services full private ownership or control is not an option. State (or its agencies) is a primary party in contractual relations either as the funder (procurer) or the regulator of the service. Hence, private participation quite often transforms the contract between the politician and the public manager into another contract between the politician (or its representatives) and private manager. One incomplete contract is replaced with another incomplete contract. Hence, if contractual incompleteness is a source of hold-up, one cannot consistently argue that private ownership is superior to public ownership for public services on grounds of contractual incompleteness.
Suitability of methodological individualism for the analysis of public services
The preoccupation of the proponents of the TIC with proof as in natural sciences lead them to utilise 'methodological individualism' in that formal analytical frameworks are developed and the explanations are provided on the basis of contracts between rational individuals alone. 7 Scientific proof necessarily requires isolation and abstraction though this may be at the cost of its relevance and validity for complex social systems. The assumption of rationality in the TIC serves to delineate behavioural context for decision making (choices). Individuals are assumed to be rational (self- This analytical framework cannot be readily applied to the public services for various reasons.
Firstly, not all decisions taken by public entities are relevant for utility maximisation by its own workers and managers. When it is relevant, it is simplistic and unrealistic to assume that choices made by the public sector are always the product of pure individual self-interest and utility maximisation.
For example, a frequently raised question in the literature is why 'rational' (self-interested) public managers privatise services that lower their authority and rid them of opportunities for rent-seeking (e.g. Margolis, 1975; Dunleavy, 1985 Dunleavy, & 1986 . Other motivations such as altruistic ethos (Kolm and Ythier 2006) may be as important in underpinning the behaviour of public sector managers. Secondly, the extent to which the public sector managers can make 'rational choices' that maximise their personal objectives at the cost of public at large depends on the nature of institutions, ethos, rules and regulations and the extent to which they are benign, restrictive or prohibitive against opportunities for personal exploitation. The initial attempts of water privatisation in Ghana involving a lease contract could be seen in this light, when the whole process collapsed as a consequence of the role media and the NGOs played at the time with widespread reporting about the suspicions of corruption in the process of selection of Azurix (an Enron subsidiary) from amongst three bidders including Suez and Vivendi (Amenga-Etego & Grusky, 2005) . Thirdly, the behaviour and choices of public sector entities is more complex and case specific than what is implied by the TIC model. The decisions in the management of public services can neither fully be explained by the preferences of the individuals working for those entities nor by the aggregation or the sum of those preferences. Besides, direct interferences due to political changes are at play in the decision making process. Indirect influence of both overt and covert forms is also sought by different interest groups.
Finally, unlike other mainstream perspectives which made use of terms such as social contracts and administered contracts (Goldberg 1976 , Vincent-Jones 2006 to account for collective interests and role of government, political sterility of the TIC is a critical weakness for its application to public policy issues. It is difficult to explain public service contracts without reference to a wide range of political interests and influences. Let us start with the question of who the contract parties are. Even though they are often formally specified in long-term public contracts, there exist multiple layers of representation for both sides but certainly more so for the public counterparty. For example, the grantor of the management contract in Ghana, the GWCL, is an agent of the government that is supposed to be ultimately representing wide range interests of different classes and groups. In fact, one could view the whole political and economic decision making process consisting of multitude of incomplete contracts between different stakeholders, e.g. voters and government, government and its agencies, public agencies and private companies. More complicating but obvious is the fact that political representation of different interest groups is neither comprehensive nor unremitted even in countries with robust democratic institutions. This is reflected well, for example, by the deep downsizing of the public sector after the 2008 financial crisis in the UK which the head of the Church of England described as "radical, long-term policies for which no one voted" (Williams 2011 ).
The political nature of decisions in public services (e.g. privatisation of one form or another)
arises from the following. Many economic or managerial decisions at macro or micro level are likely to have welfare and distributional consequences, which for some are bound to be adverse. The degree of politicization of these decisions would depend on a number of factors, especially, the nature of services in question and the market structure. Decisions about ordinary goods and services with plenty of providers and substitutes are likely to be less politicised than those involving essential services like water with life sustaining character, limited substitutes if any (there are alternatives to public supply in rural areas and to wealthier households) and single providers, operating nationally or in large geographic areas. More adverse outcomes (e.g. unaffordable service, service cuts due to non-payment, low quality of water) create greater scope for deeper politicisation, depending on the size of the population affected, presence or absence of safety nets and democratic processes for political participation.
A reflection on the importance of these issues in public services could be found in one of the very few applications of the TIC to the case of public goods in developing countries by Besley and
Ghatak (2001) who exclude for-profit private organizations from analysis as they are considered to have no intrinsic interest in welfare. Instead, they argue that when contracts are incomplete, ownership for the supply of public goods should be assigned to the non-profit NGOs that 'care' more In Ghana, too, the welfare and distributional concerns have been well justified with around 67
per cent of urban population lacking access to piped water (UNICEF and WHO 2010) and pressing problems of affordability. The burden of minimum required water consumption (25 litres per person per day) on household budget has been presented in Table 3 . Utilising the widely cited 3 per cent benchmark ratio of household water expenditure to income for the assessment of the affordability of water tariffs (Sawkins and Dickie 2005, UNDP 2006), it is clear that the cost of minimum water consumption for the 20 percent of the households at the bottom of income distribution was unaffordable even for those using public standpipes. Table 3 -Share of the cost of minimum required water consumption in household income (2008) At the other end of the spectrum of interests are powerful multinational companies that have dominated these sectors following the privatisation of utilities that opened up new markets and profit opportunities worldwide in the last two decades (Hall 2006) . The opposition of many civil society organisations and grassroots movements to the promotion of public services as outlets of profit opportunities in many countries reflect the distributional conflict between different interests groups (Oscar and Lewis 2004 , McDonald and Ruiters 2005 , Hall et al. 2005 ). In the case of Ghana, grassroots opposition to private participation in the water sector has been significant as reflected by wide ranging campaigns and interventions of the National Coalition Against Privatisation and ISODEC (e.g. Public Citizen, 2002; Fuest & Haffner, 2007) .
This distributional conflict has also been reflected by the ideological stance on contractual choices involving public interest. We use the term 'ideological stance' to mean the provision of arguments to support certain interests and/or upheld certain ideas, if necessary, in dogmatic ways despite lack of supporting evidence and presence of logical flaws in those arguments. For example, as mentioned previously, the World Bank played an influential role for the introduction of private . And yet, the Bank continued supporting similar programmes in the continent. In the last two decades, its rhetoric moved away from policy-conditional lending in favour of nationally developed and owned programmes (e.g. Groom et al, 2006; Ehrhardt et al, 2007; Bayliss and Fine, 2007) . In reality, fund seeking public authorities in developing countries promise to adopt economic policies promoted by the World Bank in order to access finance. In other words, previously prescribed polices by the Bank that formed the basis of the policy conditional lending are now submitted as 'nationally owned' and adopted policies by the governments themselves. Public private contracts are implemented to comply with lenders' implicit requirements not as a rational response to circumstances to improve the performance of the resource-stricken public water companies.
Conclusions
The theory of incomplete contracts, as part of property rights theory, suggests that when contracts are incomplete, allocation of residual rights to one party is more efficient. The scholars of the TIC have contributed to the debate on public versus private ownership by arguing that efficiency gains are likely to be greater under the latter because of the hold-up problem under the former. In this paper, we re-examined the theory of incomplete contracts in the context of public services in developing countries. We do not dispute that long-term contracts are incomplete but we argue that the TIC is flawed in its conclusions on public versus private ownership. Our arguments are derived from the evidence contained in a case study of public service contract in the urban water sector of Ghana and a critical assessment of the theory, in particular its assumptions and methodology. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 29 important for social welfare and economic development, the concept of public goods cannot be invoked for its theoretical justification. Finally, the number, technical and financial capacity of NGOs required to deliver, presumably, a wide range of 'public goods' in a poor developing country context adds further to the problematic nature of this approach in terms of its policy relevance (unless foreign NGOs are inserted into the equation, but these also lack permanency in presence and finance). Besides, a development strategy that is dependent on the work of charitable organisations is rather problematic. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 31 Indicators and baselines for performance assessment approved but agreement was pending in 2010
Chemical usage increased for all indicators. Supply of chemicals improved.
Treatment Plant Operations 4Da & c
Within 60 days, the Operator will provide the Grantor with meter specifications & locations. The minimum average daily production for at least 10 months per year will be at the level measured when the relevant bulk meter was installed or rehab. At rehabilitated or new systems, the Operator to maintain, on average for 10 months a year, the average daily production at a min of 90 % of capacity or 100 % demand Non-revenue
Water (NRW) 4C
Within 12 months, the Operator to submit a plan for reducing NRW. It will specify the estimation method in the absence of full metering, determine annual reduction targets (not less than 5% per annum) and propose penalty for failure. Implementation after the approval of the Grantor.
Agreement on targets and penalties was pending and bulk meters were still not commissioned. Measurement problems persist.
NRW for 35 systems where data was available was approx 51%. Of these, 21 systems did not comply with the MC criteria for NRW; 4 complied; 10 systems could not be assessed due to lack of comprehensive data. Power
Use 5B Within 12 months, the Operator to submit a plan for reduction in power use & proposal for incentives compensation.
Agreement on the baseline & incentives was pending.
Total power consumption declined significantly in comparison to baseline year.
Public Sector Water Use 5B4a & b
Within 6 months, the Operator to submit a plan for the reduction of water consumption by public sector entities (for at least 3% over a baseline) for discussion and agreement.
Meter installation in public entities not completed; baselines not established; agreement on incentive compensation is pending.
This MC target could not be assessed due to lack of progress on implementation of metering etc.
Customer Response
4E & 5A2d
Within 6 months, the Operator to submit a plan to reduce average customer response time to 48 hours from month 24 onwards. Monthly penalty for failure is USD 1000.
As of 2010, time and calculation of penalties were not agreed between the parties.
Due to disparities in reporting between call center and back offices, the 48-hour response time target could not be measured Source: Fichtner (2010) 
